

Road Traffic Safety Assessment in Self-Driving Vehicles Based on Time-to-Collision with Motion Orientation

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Abstract

Traffic conflict analysis based on Surrogate Safety Measures (SSMs) helps to estimate the risk level of an ego-vehicle interacting with other road users. Nonetheless, risk assessment for autonomous vehicles (AVs) is still incipient, given that most of the AVs are currently prototypes and current SSMs do not directly apply to autonomous driving styles. Therefore, to assess and quantify the potential risk arising from AV interactions with other road users, this study introduces the TTC_{mo} (Time-to-Collision with motion orientation), a metric that considers the yaw angle of conflicting objects. In fact, the yaw angle represents the orientation of the other road users and objects detected by the AV sensors, enabling a better identification of potential risk events from changes in the motion orientation and position through the geometric analysis of the boundaries for each detected object. Using the 3D object detection data annotations available from the publicly available AV datasets nuScenes and Lyft5 and the TTC_{mo} metric,

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we find that at least 8% of the interactions with objects detected around the AV present some risk level. This is meaningful, since it is possible to reduce the proportion of data analyzed by up to 60% when replacing regular TTC by our improved TTC computation.

Keywords: Surrogate Safety Measures, Autonomous Vehicles, Smart Mobility, Road Safety.

1. Introduction

The smart mobility revolution with the introduction of autonomous vehicles (AVs) does not only impact car manufacturing industry only, but also linked businesses like insurance. In fact, the way the vehicle is driven no longer depends on the human driver behavior, but on the Artificial Intelligence (AI) system controlling the vehicle and relying on a multitude of sensors. This new approach is not infallible and there are already reported accidents with vehicles with some level of autonomy (Betz et al., 2019) which raises the liability issue. As the traditional risk assessment does not apply anymore, it becomes important to investigate new metrics that can model the behavior of the AV to, ultimately, help to define the insurance premium.

Vehicle manufacturers are equipping their vehicles with driver assistance and support systems, which already constitute partial automation systems. The American SAE (Society of Automotive Engineering) has defined a classification of vehicle autonomy levels, SAE J3016 (SAE, 2018). Numbered from 0 to 5, higher autonomy levels mean greater AI complexity, as well as intensive use of sensors in the vehicle. Different autonomy levels represent different combi-

18 nations between driver involvement and the complexity or maturity of the AI
19 system controlling the vehicle. Broadly speaking, AVs have control systems to
20 detect and respond to events in the presence of objects around them. Never-
21 theless, there are limitations related to the type of situations and how they are
22 managed by the AI system. Such limitations are intrinsic to the randomness of
23 the road infrastructure and object around, as well as the weather and lighting
24 conditions inherent to the environment in which the vehicles operate. Therefore,
25 it is necessary to analyze operational factors of the vehicle that allow identifying
26 risk events for the vehicle itself, passengers, pedestrians and other road users.

27 Traffic risk events are often evaluated through Surrogate Safety Measures
28 (SSMs) (Tarko et al., 2009). SSMs are not used to prevent or avoid accidents,
29 but to assess and analyze the probability of risk events and their severity based
30 on movement parameters of the ego-vehicle and vehicles around. Currently,
31 safety analysis for regular vehicles (without autonomous functions) takes place
32 through the acquisition of data from off-the-shelf (OTS) devices and vehicle's
33 proprioceptive sensors (Ortiz et al., 2022). On the other hand, AVs contain a set
34 of technologies that aim to improve the perception of the environment outside
35 the vehicle, allowing a safety analyzes which includes road users interacting with
36 the AV, perceived through a variety of exteroceptive sensors, such as cameras
37 and LiDARs (Ortiz et al., 2022).

38 Currently, risk assessment in AVs is still incipient, given that most of these
39 vehicles are still under development. Therefore, to investigate the potential risk
40 arising from AV interactions with other road users, this study uses public AV

41 dataset from nuScenes (Caesar et al., 2020) and Lyft5 (Kesten et al., 2019) to
42 evaluate the Time-to-Collision (TTC) indicator that considers the yaw angle as
43 an additional parameter for the calculation. Our goal is to identify potential
44 risk events from changes in the motion orientation and position through the
45 geometric analysis of the boundaries for each object detected by the AV. Data
46 annotations from the 3D bounding boxes dimensions (weight w , length l , and
47 height h) and coordinates x , y , z available in the datasets are used to determine
48 the proximity with the AV. The calculation of the yaw orientation is based on
49 the camera intrinsics, i.e., parameters that characterize the optical, geometric,
50 and digital characteristics of the camera (using it as a coordinate system origin),
51 and data from the rotation and translation which corresponds to the motion of
52 objects observed by the vehicle’s camera driving video.

53 With technological advances in terms of sensing and autonomy, we aim to
54 explore the potential of using data from AV prototypes to develop strategies
55 for traffic risk events assessment. Thus, it is possible to monitor AVs through
56 variables that enable policymakers to customize services for stakeholders. For
57 this, data from real AVs in circulation on roads are used. Although AV dataset
58 characteristics are limited in time and crash events (Wang et al., 2017), these
59 allow to describe diverse patterns related to the vehicle’s abilities to interact
60 with different challenge events in a rapidly changing environment like the vehic-
61 ular. The analyzed data were filtered and processed according to the proposed
62 methodology.

63 In a nutshell, the contributions of our work are:

- 64 • We introduce the yaw angle in the TTC calculation of each object whose
65 orientation/position converges to the AV on a collision course. We analyze
66 diverse trajectories (following, head-on, and crossing scenarios) of objects
67 converging to the AV.

- 68 • We evaluate the vehicle risk based strictly on the sensor variations and
69 the evasive actions taken by the AV and, thus, provide the basis for an
70 AV driving profile model.

- 71 • We reduce the data volume analyzed in risk assessment by considering
72 the geometry of the boundaries used for object detection in the AI system
73 controller. The goal is to discard all the detected objects that do not
74 represent a real risk for the AV.

75 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related works. Section 3
76 describes the data collection, preparation and analysis used to calculate motion
77 properties and dynamics of both AV and detected objects. Section 4 shows the
78 TTC calculation based on yaw orientation and motion properties of both AV
79 and objects in collision course. Section 5 presents and discuss the results, and
80 finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and presents future work.

81 **2. Related work**

82 Different safety indicators have been designed for risk assessment in traffic
83 conflicts (Mahmud et al., 2017). Indeed, these indicators are characterized by
84 the fact that they allow to quantify the severity of traffic risk events. Addition-

85 ally, it is possible to estimate the level of risk in scenarios where historical crash
86 data is unavailable. This work focuses on SSMs as a technique to assess risk.
87 SSM use in this work is briefly discussed in the following.

88 *2.1. Surrogate safety measures*

89 SSMs are defined as measurements that are used to describe the relationship
90 between road users pairs in a traffic risk event to quantify the crash probability
91 or the potential traffic conflict severity in a meaningful way. Traffic conflicts
92 analysis can be based on evasive actions or temporal/spatial proximity (Zheng
93 et al., 2014). In particular, we aim to describe traffic conflicts based on temporal
94 and spatial proximity using the Time-to-Collision (TTC) metric, a safety esti-
95 mation indicator based on distance and speed variations. Through the analysis
96 of these factors, it is possible to estimate and argue the severity of risk events
97 associated with the vehicle. However, traffic conflicts do not depend only on
98 the vehicle operation, and therefore, the analysis of risk events is subject also
99 to the nature of the decisions by the drivers in the presence of any traffic risk
100 event. An example of this is the reaction time, actions to minimize accidents,
101 the veracity of evasive actions, as well as the intensity of evasive actions.

102 *2.2. Time-to-Collision (TTC)*

103 TTC is defined as the time it would take for the ego-vehicle to collide with
104 an object ahead, if the current relative speed was maintained from the previous
105 advance along the same path (Hayward, 1972). This is a continuous measure of
106 safety that can be calculated at any moment as long as the ego-vehicle and the

107 object are in a conflict area, i.e., an instantaneous situation where two or more
 108 road users interact in a road segment, with some uncertain, non-zero probability
 109 of colliding in the near future. Thus, TTC enables the collision course analysis
 110 for vehicles and predicts how is the vehicle’s motion related to other users of the
 111 road infrastructure. Moreover, TTC is the simplest and most effective analytical
 112 metric for collision risk assessment in according to their study (Tak et al., 2018).

113 Equation 1 defines the TTC as the relation of the distance between the
 114 ego-vehicle and objects ahead ($d_{(ego,obj)}$) and speed difference between both
 115 ego-vehicle (v_{ego}) and an object ahead (v_{obj}); for simplicity in this case we
 116 assume the object is another vehicle. Typically, the TTC value indicates the
 117 minimum time to collide, calculated continuously through the detection process
 118 of a potential traffic risk event. In the situation of imminent collision, TTC
 119 values assume finite decreasing values as the severity of the traffic risk event
 120 increases. It is worth noting that the TTC value allows inferring the amount
 121 of reaction time available for evasive maneuvers as a measurement of the risk
 122 level.

$$TTC = \begin{cases} \frac{d_{(obj,ego)}}{v_{ego}-v_{obj}}, & \text{if } v_{ego} > v_{obj} \\ \infty, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

123 Due to TTC limitations (it ignores evasive actions, speed restrictions of the
 124 ego-vehicle direction related to the object ahead), several modifications have
 125 been proposed to improve the accuracy of this metric.

126 *2.2.1. Modified Time-to-Collision (MTTC)*

127 Modified Time-to-Collision (MTTC) (Ozbay et al., 2008) uses acceleration as
128 a parameter to analyze the vehicle trajectory and its conflict discrepancies due to
129 acceleration/deceleration. However, MTTC depends on both the acceleration of
130 the following vehicle and the leading vehicle, the latter being difficult to measure
131 or obtain, from the ego-vehicle. Furthermore, MTTC by itself does not allow
132 the severity of potential risk events to be quantified, since various combinations
133 of distance/velocity/acceleration may produce similar MTTC values. For this,
134 the authors propose a Crash Index (CI) that uses kinematic variation factors to
135 estimate the severity of risk events (Ozbay et al., 2008). The authors conclude
136 that CI can effectively model the temporal distribution of accidents to the same
137 extent as MTTC.

138 *2.2.2. Enhanced Time-to-Collision (ETTC)*

139 Another TTC variation is the Enhanced Time-to-Collision (ETTC) (Kiefer
140 et al., 2005). ETTC assumes that following and leading vehicles do not change
141 their courses until a collision occurs. Moreover, deceleration in leading vehicle
142 is considered until it stops. On the other hand, following vehicle's deceleration
143 is considered to zero when the brake onset. Thus, ETTC calculation allows to
144 define thresholds for "near" and "far" perception in Forward Collision Warning
145 systems.

146 *2.2.3. Time-to-Collision with Disturbance (TTCD)*

147 Time-to-Collision with Disturbance (TTCD) analyzes collision risks product
148 of disturbances in the leading vehicles (Xie et al., 2019). TTCD also can capture
149 rear-end conflict risks in car-following scenarios where the leading vehicle may
150 have higher speed. TTCD considers the deceleration product of the disturbance,
151 and the critical deceleration rate imposed by the leading vehicle deceleration.

152 *2.2.4. Time Exposed TTC (TET) and Time Integrated TTC (TIT)*

153 On the other hand, to determine safety evaluations based on TTC in time
154 intervals, other indicators have been proposed to describe micro-levels of safe
155 and safety-critical events derived from the TTC value analysis. The Time Ex-
156 posed Time to Collision (TET) is an indicator proposed in (Minderhoud and
157 Bovy, 2001) which analyzes the time period that a vehicle remains exposed
158 to high-risk events based on TTC values. These time periods analyze TTC
159 measurements by thresholds defining the risk level. Thus, TET represents the
160 duration of the exposition of safety-critical TTC values over a specified time
161 duration. Thus, all of the instants in which the driver is following the leading
162 vehicle, which $0 < TTC < TTC^*$ must be summed. Nonetheless, this indicator
163 takes into account a single threshold TTC^* (i.e., safety/safety-critical events),
164 and therefore, it does not consider the variation between lower TTC values. To
165 reduce the impact of low TTC values do not affect the TET indicator, Minder-
166 houd *et al.* (Minderhoud and Bovy, 2001) propose the Time Integrated Time to
167 Collision (TIT) metric which integrates the TTC to define the safety level for
168 each TET interval analyzed in each driver's profile. Thus, TTC values below

169 TTC* is also considered in the calculation process.

170 In addition to their improvements, TTC's variation metrics (MTTC, ETTC,
 171 TTCD, TET and TIT) also have disadvantages. These metrics are limited by
 172 the absence of motion analysis of the road users interacting with the ego-vehicle
 173 (e.g., evasive maneuvers, motion orientation, among others) when they are in a
 174 collision course. Table 1 shows a comparison of the approaches to improve TTC
 175 calculation.

Table 1: Summary of previous approaches using TTC.

Approach	Methodology	Advantages	Disadvantages
TTC (Hayward, 1972)	Calculation based on constant speed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simple calculation based on distance and speed variations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ignores motion characteristics of the ego-vehicle and road users.
MTTC (Ozbay et al., 2008)	Calculation uses acceleration in TTC general formulation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MTTC considers the acceleration of ego-vehicle and other vehicles during collision course. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ignores motion characteristics of the ego-vehicle and road users.
ETTC (Kiefer et al., 2005)	Calculation uses deceleration behavior of the objects ahead.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ETTC considers characteristics of the objects ahead and their behavior when deceleration events occurs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ignores motion characteristics of the ego-vehicle and road users.
TTCD (Xie et al., 2019)	Calculation considers the effects of disturbing events in vehicles ahead of the ego-vehicle.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TTCD Analyzes reactions of the objects ahead that can affect the ego-vehicle. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ignores motion characteristics of the ego-vehicle and road users. • It is not clear how to apply the TTCD in diverse scenarios.
TET—TIT (Minderhoud and Bovy, 2001)	Calculation considers time duration and extension for the ego-vehicle drives in high-risky situations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures consider time intervals for safety analysis. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ignores variations occurred in TTC analysis.
TTC _{mo}	Calculation considers motion orientation of the objects ahead with respect to the ego-vehicle.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This metric considers motion orientation on the ego-vehicle's motion axis. • TTC_{mo} considers just the objects ahead in collision course with the ego-vehicle. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Depends on accuracy from semantic segmentation classification and bounding boxes processing in the ego-vehicle.

176 2.3. SSMs based on motion dynamics

177 Some studies analyze unrestricted road users' motion as part of the dynam-
 178 ics in vehicular environments. Miller *et al.* (Miller and Huang, 2002) develop

179 a collision warning system that analyzes traffic risk events and evasive actions,
180 sharing the location and kinematic measures from the ego-vehicle and the sur-
181 rounding vehicles. The algorithm analyzes the time to collision and the time to
182 avoidance in a parametric way. Laureshyn *et al.* (Laureshyn et al., 2010) pro-
183 pose a theoretical analysis of SSMs in collision course to determine the severity
184 of traffic risk events. Given that interactions between road users are continuous,
185 the authors suggest some strategies to calculate TTC for conflicts of different
186 angles at constant speed. The authors stated that in potential collisions, a cor-
187 ner of one of the vehicles touches one side of the other vehicle. Thus, a new
188 concept for TTC is developed, which calculates TTC between a moving line
189 section of the ego-vehicle and a point in the other vehicle, in a time instant
190 t . Next, the coordinates of the line section ending after t seconds based on a
191 constant speed motion. Some assumptions about parallel motion are defined,
192 depending on gradient of the line. Jiménez *et al.* (Jiménez et al., 2013) make an
193 improved calculation of TTC in (Miller and Huang, 2002), assuming the vehicle
194 geometry to be rectangular. In addition to the simplified calculation, the system
195 analyzes the dimensions of the vehicles involved in the interaction, and the areas
196 involved in a potential traffic conflict. In this way, Qu *et al.* (Qu et al., 2018)
197 proposes a TTC method with motion orientation based on GPS coordinates to
198 analyze cross-collision events. The authors use GPS data to calculate speed and
199 distance, as well as the heading and the orientation angles of the target vehicle.
200 The authors use a rectangle model to represent the shape of the target vehicles.
201 The experiments are carried out in a simulated environment with two test vehi-

cles. The results show that rectangular model enables the TTC calculation more accurately, and can also have superior performance when the angle between two vehicles is small, reducing false alarms. Ward *et al.* (Ward et al., 2015) analyze the interactions between vehicles to define a prediction system and avoidance of collisions in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication systems. The method analyzes TTC for vehicles without motion restrictions. The authors calculate TTC in 2D, based on the relative vehicle motion and a looming method (a technique for gating predictions based on the relative motion of the vehicles), which considers the relationship of the vehicle roll angle, linear and angular velocity, and the yaw rate vector. Wachenfeld *et al.* (Wachenfeld et al., 2016) propose a Worst-Time-To-Collision (WTTC) metric to identify risk events related to the mobility dynamics of objects. The authors do a physical analysis of vehicle motion using the Kamm’s circle (a theory about the transferable forces from the tire to the road surface) and entering the yaw angle.

Differently from these studies, this paper analyzes the motion orientation of diverse road users that surround the ego-vehicle, detected through exteroceptive sensors, which enables the analysis not only with vehicles, but also with pedestrians and two-wheelers. Table 2 shows a comparison of the approaches involving motion orientation to improve TTC calculation.

2.4. SSMs based on data analysis

To analyze multiple interactions through SSMs, several works have developed studies based on software simulation. Papadoulis *et al.* (Papadoulis et al., 2019) and Viridi *et al.* (Viridi et al., 2019) performs a safety assessment for autonomous

Table 2: Summary of works considering motion orientation in the TTC calculation.

Approach	Methodology	Advantages	Disadvantages
Miller and Huang (2002)	The authors propose a collision warning system based on calculation of intersection points.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The system includes an algorithm for intersection collision warning detection and considers communication strategies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ignores motion characteristics of the ego-vehicle and road users.
Laureshyn et al. (2010)	Calculation of TTC based on convergence in different angles at constant speed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The framework enables to calculate collision probability based on TTC in sideswipe conflicts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited by disregarding motion characteristics of the ego-vehicle and road users.
Jiménez et al. (2013)	The authors make an improved calculation of TTC based on methodology proposed in Miller and Huang (2002).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The framework considers vehicle geometry to be rectangular. The tool considers also the dimensions of vehicles involved in the conflict. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The framework is not tested on a real scenario.
Qu et al. (2018)	The authors propose a methodology to analyze cross-collision events based on GPS data.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The system considers vehicle geometry to be rectangular. The system uses GPS data to analyze orientation and heading angles of the target vehicle. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The system is limited by the GPS precision and randomness of target vehicles.
Ward et al. (2015)	The authors propose an indicator that generalizes TTC to the planar case, mapping vehicle trajectories on the road to predict traffic conflicts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Planar analysis relies heavily on the relative positions of other traffic participants at the moment of predict the risk of a traffic conflict between vehicles. The model considers uncertainties by communication (V2V). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The model ignores other road users in the ego-vehicle vicinity.
Wachenfeld et al. (2016)	The authors propose a method to reduce the amount of data to estimate the criticality of a conflict.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The method considers the motion orientation through yaw angles. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WTTC can define uncritical events as potential risky, e.g., vehicles travel side by side. WTTC does not consider other road users.
Our proposal (TTC _{mo})	Calculation considers motion orientation of the objects ahead with respect to the ego-vehicle.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This metric considers motion orientation on the ego-vehicle's motion axis. TTC_{mo} considers just the objects ahead in collision course with the ego-vehicle. TTC_{mo} also discards other objects out the ego-vehicle's path. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Depends on accuracy from semantic segmentation classification and bounding boxes processing in the ego-vehicle.

225 and connected vehicle fleets through the SSAM simulation tool (Surrogate Safety
226 Assessment Model). The authors observed that most AV conflicts occur at in-
227 tersections, and concluded that depending on the degree of AV penetration, the
228 conflict rate may decrease. Zhang *et al.* (Zhang et al., 2020) evaluate the safety
229 of connected autonomous vehicles by analyzing lane switching and exclusivity
230 through the simulation tool PTV-VISSIM. On the other hand, Alghodhaifi and
231 Lakshmanan (Alghodhaifi and Lakshmanan, 2020) analyze SSMs as a basis for
232 a pedestrian protection system, through simulations in Matlab/Simulink.

233 Other works described in the literature analyze SSM metrics in data collec-

234 tion from naturalistic conduction studies. These testbeds use diverse extero-
235 ceptive sensors such as radars, cameras, GNSS, or V2X communication devices,
236 to detect objects around the vehicle. Data sources, such as 100-Car (Dingus
237 et al., 2006) and SHRP2 (Campbell and , U.S.) have been extensively studied
238 via TTC to formulate safety metrics, analyze risk events, and compare simu-
239 lated and real environments (Montgomery et al., 2014; Markkula et al., 2016).
240 In the same way, Safety Pilot Model Deployment (SPMD) used around 3,000
241 human-driven vehicles, equipped with V2V communication devices and Mobil-
242 eye sensing devices (Nodine et al., 2015). He *et al.* (He et al., 2018) evaluate
243 SSMS from SPMD data. The authors implement three metrics: TTC, MTTC,
244 and the Deceleration Rate to Avoid Collision (DRAC). The authors observed
245 that the MTTC presented the best overall performance. Kusano *et al.* (Kusano
246 et al., 2014) develop a methodology to identify situations where the ego-vehicle
247 driver generates an evasive braking action. The authors use radar data and kine-
248 matic measures from the ego-vehicle (Dingus et al., 2006) to calculate the TTC
249 as metric to activate warning actions. Five car-following scenarios are identi-
250 fied to implement the algorithm: scenarios where the leading vehicle or lack of
251 leading vehicle lack is correctly identified by the algorithm; scenarios where the
252 leading vehicle is detected but it is not in collision course with the following ve-
253 hicle; and scenarios where the algorithm failed to identify the leading vehicle or
254 detects other objects different of the visual analysis. The authors conclude that
255 the algorithm can identify 91.8% of the braking events when verified visually.

256 On the other hand, analysis of SSMS in self-driving vehicles is limited. How-

257 ever, multiple AV developers have made available traces of their vehicles in the
258 test phase (Ortiz et al., 2022). Beauchamp *et al.* (Beauchamp et al., 2022) make
259 an analysis of safety measures considering collected video data captured by au-
260 tomated shuttles in two cities. The authors defined five possible interactions
261 with other road users based on the collision angle and the parallelism angle:
262 head-on, rear-end, side parallel and leaving. The safety indicators computed in
263 this work were speed, acceleration, TTC and PET. The authors conclude that
264 all the analyzed interactions were safe, due to the limited speed of the shuttle
265 compared to other road users around it. De Ceunynck *et al.* (De Ceunynck et al.,
266 2022) perform behavioral observations of two automated shuttles in Norway at
267 intersections with various road users, such as pedestrians, scooters or bicycles.
268 The authors conclude that more than 90% of the interactions with pedestrians
269 are not dangerous, while there were some inconsistencies in the recognition of cy-
270 clists when turning. Alozi *et al.* (Alozi and Hussein, 2022) propose a framework
271 based on Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to assess the safety of AV-pedestrian
272 interactions by quantifying potential conflicts between them. The authors use
273 data from nuScenes and Lyft5 AVs, and data from manual driven vehicles to
274 test the accuracy of the EVT approach in relation to vehicle-pedestrian accident
275 data. The goal is to reduce the pedestrian accident rate per million vehicle kilo-
276 meters travelled. The analysis uses TTC and PET to evaluate the interactions.
277 The authors estimate that the AV-pedestrian accident rate is between 4.041 and
278 5.499 per million vehicle kilometers traveled, which is a high value considering
279 the safety of pedestrians.

280 Differently from these studies, this paper analyzes real data from AVs involv-
 281 ing the orientation and position of the detected objects in order to accurately
 282 describe the motion of road users with the respect to the AV. Table 3 shows a
 283 comparison of the approaches using diverse data sources.

Table 3: Summary of works considering diverse data sources for safety analysis.

Approach	Methodology	Advantages	Disadvantages
Software simulation-based	Analysis of multiple scenarios with penetration rate capacity.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It allows to implement flexible scenarios both in scalability and in time execution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is not possible to simulate all the factors that are involved in driving, from human factors to unpredictable events such as fog.
Naturalistic data	Analysis of real-world data from the drivers (profiling) and the external environment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Naturalistic driving provides sensor setups to analyze both driving behavior and external environment related with the events that may occur. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A limitation in self-driving vehicles is inferred by the AVs' penetration degree in the road infrastructure.
Beauchamp et al. (2022)	The authors make an analysis of safety measures considering video frames captured camera sensor in automated shuttles.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The methodology considers collision and parallelism angles that enable the analysis considering how is the interaction with other road users. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The authors do not consider the heading orientation in the calculation of safety metrics used to analyze the interactions between the shuttle and the road users. • Analysis depends on semantic data and categorization.
De Ceunynck et al. (2022)	The authors make an analysis of the impact of conflicts between AVs and pedestrians considering data collected by automated shuttles.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The authors make a behavioral analysis of the automated shuttle interacting with other road users as pedestrians, bicycles or scooters. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The authors do not consider the heading orientation in the calculation of safety metrics used to analyze the interactions between the shuttle and the road users. • Analysis depends on semantic data and categorization.
Alozi and Hussein (2022)	The authors propose a method to assess safety in the AV-pedestrian interactions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The method considers all the interactions with pedestrians. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The authors do not consider the heading orientation in the analysis of AV-pedestrian interactions. • Analysis depends on semantic data and categorization.
Our proposal (TTC_{mo})	Calculation considers motion orientation of the objects ahead with respect to the ego-vehicle.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This metric considers motion orientation on the ego-vehicle's motion axis. • TTC_{mo} considers just the objects ahead in collision course with the ego-vehicle. • TTC_{mo} also discards other objects out the ego-vehicle's path. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis depends on semantic data and categorization.

284 2.5. SSMs based on exteroceptive sensors

285 Studies on the evaluation of TTC through exteroceptive sensors have been
 286 developed to recognize the various entities with which a vehicle can interact.
 287 Aycard *et al.* (Aycard et al., 2011) propose a risk assessment system at intersec-
 288 tions. The authors use data fusion from camera and LiDAR sensors to detect
 289 and establish the dynamics of detected objects. For risk quantification, the

290 TTC is used as a collision risk indicator. The authors conclude that risk assess-
291 ment through environmental perception can enhance safety applications in the
292 automotive industry. Kilicarslan and Zheng (Kilicarslan and Zheng, 2019) ana-
293 lyze vehicle collisions through TTC using video cameras. The authors analyze
294 the divergence of horizontal and vertical movement in video frames without
295 relying on bounding boxes. To this aim, TTC analysis is based on the size
296 variations of the detected object in the video, divided by the size changes in
297 time intervals. The analysis of the algorithm proposed by the authors is used
298 in videos of naturalistic driving without accidents. Results show 94% accuracy
299 and 93% precision in the relationship between the computed system and the
300 actual video. Meanwhile, compared to the detection of the LiDAR sensor in
301 the KITTI dataset (Geiger et al., 2012), the authors observe that LiDAR-based
302 measurements depend on the depth of detection, discontinued detection, in ad-
303 dition to requiring 3D analysis. In this sense, video frame analysis is robust and
304 can have a higher degree of accuracy.

305 The analysis of road safety metrics is closely related to the collection of im-
306 age data from specific areas (mostly intersections), or video analysis in vehicles
307 with embedded devices. Unlike these works, this study explores the potential
308 of using data generated by AVs to develop road safety analysis solutions based
309 on the vehicles' own sensing. Specifically, we focus on the TTC analysis with
310 emphasis on the road users' motion orientation. Depending on the road users'
311 orientation, TTC must be evaluated differently to accurately validate traffic
312 conflicts involving the AV. This paper analyzes TTC based on the road users'

313 orientation and position related to the AV. For that, nuScenes AV dataset (Caesar et al., 2020) and Lyft5 dataset (Kesten et al., 2019) are used in this study to
314 analyze the motion orientation and position of the detected objects by the AV
315 while it is moving. The goal is to analyze the TTC based on the yaw angle of the
316 detected object and its position with respect to the AV through data analysis
317 from exteroceptive sensors' data readings in AVs. To the best of our knowledge,
318 this is the first analysis considering orientation for the TTC calculation based
319 on data from AVs.

321 **3. Methodology**

322 Some experimental AV dataset are publicly available. In this work, we
323 use two datasets including semantic data, nuScenes (Caesar et al., 2020) and
324 Lyft5 (Kesten et al., 2019). As described in (Ortiz et al., 2022), these datasets
325 have various characteristics that can be analyzed for braking and sudden accel-
326 eration analysis. In the following, we first describe how we extract data from
327 the dataset and how TTC metrics are computed.

328 *3.1. Dataset overview*

329 *nuScenes*: nuScenes (Caesar et al., 2020) is a public large-scale dataset of
330 autonomous driving traces which includes images from camera, point clouds
331 (PC) from LiDAR, and radar signals detected by the sensors installed on the
332 vehicle. This dataset also provides data from the vehicle internal sensors (e.g.,
333 acceleration or speed). In total, the dataset includes almost 6 hours of data

334 gathered by two AVs, one in Boston (US), the other one in Singapore (SG).

335 The internal sensing data is acquired from the CAN bus.

336 *Lyft5*: Lyft5 (Kesten et al., 2019) is another public large-scale dataset of

337 AV traces, which contains images from cameras and LiDAR PCs. The percep-

338 tion dataset consists of 2.5 hours of data gathered by twelve vehicles in Palo

339 Alto (PA) divided into 180 scenes of 25 seconds each. Unlike the nuScenes AV

340 dataset, Lyft5 does not provide CAN bus data from the vehicle.




Figure 1: Sensor setup for nuScenes (Caesar et al., 2020) and Lyft5 (Kesten et al., 2019).

341 Table 4 summarizes characteristics of nuScenes and Lyft5 datasets. We an-

342alyze the training data available for both datasets. As perception datasets, the

343raw data is processed by a perception system that uses sensory systems and

344software to perform multiple behavioral observations and interactions from dif-

345ferent objects around the ego-vehicle, i.e., infrastructure and road users (Hous-

346ton et al., 2020). Each detected object is described as an instance and it can

347have multiple interactions with the AV. Each instance is marked with a 3D

348bounding box, and categorization and attribute labels; each interaction of that

349instance with the AV is recorded in a log. Examples of categorization are ve-

350hicle type, two-wheelers, pedestrians, road infrastructure, among others, and

351 attributes are vehicles or pedestrians stopped, in motion, among others. The
 352 nuScenes AV dataset contains day/night scenes with different weather condi-
 353 tions, 23 categories and 9 attributes for in-motion objects. On the other hand,
 354 Lyft5 contains less scenes, but the proportion of 3D bounding boxes annotations
 355 is similar to that of nuScenes AV dataset. Similarly to nuScenes, Lyft5 defines
 356 9 categories and 18 attributes.

Table 4: Statistics of the two AV datasets.

	Scenes	Vehicles	Images	LiDAR PCs	Radar PCs	Bounding Boxes	Day/ Night	Weather	Categories/ Attributes
nuScenes	850	2	1.4 M	400 k	1.3 M	1.4 M	Yes	Yes	23/9
Lyft5	180	12	323 k	46 k	0	1.3 M	No	No	9/18

357 Both nuScenes and Lyft5 datasets include data from keyframes (i.e., syn-
 358 chronized samples among LiDAR, Radar and camera data, at 2 Hz and 5 Hz,
 359 respectively (Caesar et al., 2020; Kesten et al., 2019)), and data from each sensor
 360 sweeps, based on the sampling frequency of each one. Metadata of all samples
 361 are available in JSON files format. Moreover, the datasets provide training data,
 362 that is, data with sample annotations used to describe diverse characteristics of
 363 the object itself around the ego-vehicle, based on LiDAR PCs and JPEG images
 364 from the cameras.

365 3.2. Data preparation

366 Analysis on safety assessment requires to use data resulting from functional
 367 areas of AVs (IEEE Electronics Packaging Society, 2019). Thus, acquisition data
 368 (e.g., raw data from sensors like camera, GPS/IMU, among others), perception
 369 data (e.g., object detection, location, environment), cognition data (e.g., mo-

370 tion planning, maneuvers, among others) and action data (e.g., speed, brakes,
371 steering, among others). Figure 2(a) shows the data used for both AV and
372 detected objects through the exteroceptive sensors, with respect to functional
373 areas for the AV performance analysis. Thus, AV and detected objects meta-
374 data are used to assess the safety of AV interactions with various road users and
375 infrastructure. It is worth noting that it is possible to assess safety with respect
376 to users other than vehicles, such as pedestrians and two-wheelers. Therefore,
377 data from all AV autonomy phases are used to assess risk events for the cat-
378 egories of detected objects in the dataset, in order to establish a standard of
379 AV driving with respect to the road users' motion. Although traffic accidents
380 are unexpected and rare events that can be associated with multiple causing
381 factors, this analysis can help to explain more clearly potential traffic accidents
382 since any collision describes a convergence approach between the users involved
383 in the collision, as described in Figure 2(b).

384 *3.2.1. Motion orientation and position angle*

385 Our goal is to identify the allocentric and egocentric spatial relations between
386 detected objects and the ego-vehicle, defined by relative directions, distances and
387 bearings (Meilinger and Vosgerau, 2010). Allocentric data is based on relations
388 object-to-object. On the other hand, egocentric data is based on relations self-
389 to-object (Meilinger and Vosgerau, 2010). Thus, our analysis uses the heading
390 orientation (yaw angle) as an allocentric representation of the motion orientation
391 (direction) of each detected object with respect to the ego-vehicle. Motion
392 orientation enables to describe when an object is converging to or diverging




Figure 2: Summary of data used to analyze traffic risk events based on motion orientation.

393 of the ego-vehicle’s course. In the meantime, the position angle is used as
 394 egocentric representation to describe the location of the objects with respect
 395 to the ego-vehicle. Position angle enables to infer the severity of a risk event
 396 conditioned by the position and the orientation of each detected object while
 397 interacting with the ego-vehicle. From the analysis of the dynamics of road users
 398 and the ego-vehicle, it is possible to evaluate metrics inherent to the objects’
 399 motion. For that, we use the nuScenes and Lyft5 devkits (nuTonomy, 2018; Lyft
 400 SDK, 2019), which provides a set of libraries to manipulate their datasets. We
 401 compute the bounding box orientation, swapping the sensor coordinate frame
 402 $[x, y, z]$ of the LiDAR $([1, 0, 0])$ for the camera $([0, -1, 0])$, according to the
 403 coordinate frames defined for each sensor. In this way, we set the yaw angles
 404 for each object detected based on the sensor coordinate frame of the frontal
 405 camera, as observed in Figure 1.

406 Furthermore, to describe the spatial orientation of the vehicle and the de-
 407 tected objects the yaw angle is used, as shown in Figure 3(a). Yaw angles (ψ)
 408 also indicate the orientation of each detected object. North is 0° (ψ_0), east is
 409 90° (ψ_1), west is -90° (ψ_2) and south is $\pm 180^\circ$ (ψ_3). Objects have positive
 410 heading in clockwise direction and negative value in counterclockwise direction.
 411 About the ego-vehicle, we assume that yaw angle is $\psi_{ego} = 0^\circ$. Thus, detected
 412 objects with yaw angle between $\psi_2 < \psi_0 < \psi_1$ indicate that the direction on
 413 z-axis is forward the ego-vehicle; meanwhile, yaw angles between $\psi_1 < \psi_3 < \psi_2$
 414 indicate that the direction is opposite to the ego-vehicle, as shown in Figure 3(b).
 415 On the other hand, position angles (θ) indicate the location of an object with
 416 respect to the ego-vehicle. Position angles $0^\circ < \theta < 90^\circ$ indicate object loca-
 417 tions at right-side with respect to the driving direction, while $-90^\circ < \theta < 0^\circ$
 418 at left-side, as shown in Figure 3(c). Bounding box centroid coordinates (x, z)
 419 are used to determine θ . Thus, it is possible to establish when the ego-vehicle
 420 path is converging with detected objects.

421 3.2.2. Geometric analysis of objects and ego-vehicle

422 As shown in Figure 4, we use the ego-vehicle size specification to obtain a ge-
 423 ometric representation and to analyze the interaction with surrounding objects.
 424 The width and length of the detected objects, available from the bounding
 425 boxes, are considered in the geometric analysis. In this sense, each vertex is
 426 labeled to determine its location and orientation when the object moves and
 427 rotates. The ego-vehicle is also represented as a bounding box. It is impor-
 428 tant to note that since $\psi_{ego} = 0$, the position of its vertices will always be the




Figure 3: Relationship between AV and detected objects via motion orientation and position angle.

429 same for the analysis. In addition, the remaining space between the lane width
 430 and the ego-vehicle width is used as a safety area (sa_n , where n is an object
 431 identifier), to identify objects adjacent to the AV that may represent potential
 432 traffic conflicts. The lane width is based on the respective road city regulations.
 433 Vehicle size specifications are reported in Table 5.

434 To determine which objects are in collision course with the ego-vehicle, we
 435 aim to identify adjacent or overlapping trajectories between the ego-vehicle and
 436 other objects through motion orientation analysis. In this way, we identify be-

Table 5: nuScenes and Lyft5 vehicle overall dimensions. The width (w) includes external mirrors. The length between camera and vehicle front-side (l_{cf}) and the length between camera and vehicle rear-side (l_{cr}) are based on the camera location on the vehicle’s rooftop.

Dimensions	Vehicle	
	nuScenes (Renault Zoe)	Lyft5 (Ford Fusion)
w [m]	1.945	2.121
l [m]	4.087	4.871
h [m]	1.562	1.478
l_{cf} [m]	1.810	2.302
l_{cr} [m]	2.277	2.569




Figure 4: Geometric representation for an object (a) and the ego-vehicle (b).

437 havior indicators according to the AV reaction in several possible interactions
438 with the objects around. Thus, we process AVs data to identify these interac-
439 tions. In this analysis, we consider data annotations of the camera’s coordinate
440 system as reference. Information of the bounding box like the yaw rate (ψ),
441 centroid position data in the image (x, y, z), and the size (w, l, h) are ex-
442 tracted from each annotation. Each vertex of a bounding box and the AVs are
443 calculated by the relationship between sizes and the centroid coordinates, as
444 described in Equation 2:

$$\begin{aligned}
a_x, d_x &= x - \frac{w}{2}, \\
b_x, c_x &= x + \frac{w}{2}, \\
a_z, b_z &= z + \frac{l}{2}, \\
c_z, d_z &= z - \frac{l}{2}.
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

445 Table 6 shows the vertices calculation for both the ego-vehicle and bounding
446 boxes. We also model the ego-vehicle as a bounding box to analyze the inter-
447 action of each corner of it with the detected objects. Thus, we consider the
448 position of the camera on the vehicle’s rooftop as the origin x, z . It is important
449 to note that the camera position does not correspond to the vehicle’s centroid,
450 and therefore, it is necessary to calculate l_{cf} and l_{cr} , as shown in Figure 4(b).
451 Furthermore, we assume that $\psi = 0$ since we analyze the interactions with
452 objects detected from images captured by the AV front camera.

Table 6: Relation between the centroid position in the bounding box and the ψ_{obj} rotation.

Vertices	Bounding Box		nuScenes/Lyft5	
	x_{obj}	z_{obj}	x_{ego}	z_{ego}
a	$a_{x_{obj}} \cos(\psi_{obj}) + a_{z_{obj}} \sin(\psi_{obj}) + x_{obj}$	$-a_{x_{obj}} \sin(\psi_{obj}) + a_{z_{obj}} \cos(\psi_{obj}) + z_{obj}$	$a_{x_{ego}}$	$z_{ego} + l_{cf}$
b	$b_{x_{obj}} \cos(\psi_{obj}) + b_{z_{obj}} \sin(\psi_{obj}) + x_{obj}$	$-b_{x_{obj}} \sin(\psi_{obj}) + b_{z_{obj}} \cos(\psi_{obj}) + z_{obj}$	$b_{x_{ego}}$	$z_{ego} + l_{cf}$
c	$c_{x_{obj}} \cos(\psi_{obj}) + c_{z_{obj}} \sin(\psi_{obj}) + x_{obj}$	$-c_{x_{obj}} \sin(\psi_{obj}) + c_{z_{obj}} \cos(\psi_{obj}) + z_{obj}$	$c_{x_{ego}}$	$z_{ego} - l_{cr}$
d	$d_{x_{obj}} \cos(\psi_{obj}) + d_{z_{obj}} \sin(\psi_{obj}) + x_{obj}$	$-d_{x_{obj}} \sin(\psi_{obj}) + d_{z_{obj}} \cos(\psi_{obj}) + z_{obj}$	$d_{x_{ego}}$	$z_{ego} - l_{cr}$

453 Next, we analyze when an intersection exists between ego-vehicle vertices
454 and bounding boxes converging to the AV path. For this, data from the de-
455 tected object vertices and ego-vehicle vertices are analyzed to determine the
456 interactions between them. For this analysis, a line segment is defined as the

457 line connecting the adjacent vertices of the bounding box. We define line's
 458 equation for each selected bounding box segment of both the object and the
 459 ego-vehicle and potential intersections are calculated, as shown in Equation 3:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A_{ego}x + B_{ego}z &= C_{ego}, \\
 A_{obj}x + B_{obj}z &= C_{obj},
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{3}$$

460 where A , B , and C correspond to the line's equation values for each segment
 461 of the bounding box (object) interacting with the ego-vehicle. These values are
 462 given by a set of conditions that depend on the detected object's orientation.

463 Once the line equations have been calculated, the resulting values are used
 464 to compute the intersection coordinates at x , z :

$$\begin{aligned}
 x_{ego \cap obj} &= \frac{(B_{ego}C_{obj}) - (B_{obj}C_{ego})}{(A_{ego}B_{obj}) - (A_{obj}B_{ego})}, \\
 z_{ego \cap obj} &= \frac{(A_{obj}C_{ego}) - (A_{ego}C_{obj})}{(A_{ego}B_{obj}) - (A_{obj}B_{ego})}.
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{4}$$

465 Then, the distance d is calculated between the potential conflict vertices and
 466 segments between the detected object and the ego-vehicle:

$$d = \sqrt{(x_{segego} - x_{ego \cap obj})^2 + (z_{segego} - z_{ego \cap obj})^2}.
 \tag{5}$$

467 The geometric analysis of the ego-vehicle in relation to any detected ob-
 468 ject, using the motion orientation of the latter, allows us to evaluate divers

469 eventualities:

470 • **Identification of the first impact point:** This methodology enables
471 to evaluate the first point of impact of the ego-vehicle with any detected
472 object that is on the collision course at a given instant of time.

473 • **Approach type:** The geometric analysis also enables evaluating points
474 of potential impact on the detected object. Furthermore, how the ap-
475 proximations occur can help to understand how the AV decision-making
476 occurs. On the other hand, it is also possible to analyze other sensors,
477 such as the side cameras; In this work we only analyze the interactions
478 detected in the front camera. Side cameras analysis is not part of this
479 work.

480 • **Interaction with other road users:** In addition to analyzing other
481 vehicles interacting with the AV, it is also possible to evaluate how in-
482 teractions with other road users occur, e.g., pedestrians, two-wheelers,
483 objects, animals, among others. However, this analysis depends on the
484 semantic data and categorization of objects detected by the AV.

485 Finally, it is possible to identify the location of objects around the AV. As
486 shown in Figure 5, this methodology allows observing the potential impact point
487 on the ego-vehicle $(x_{seg_{ego}}, z_{seg_{ego}})$, on the detected object $(x_{ego \cap obj}, z_{ego \cap obj})$,
488 as well as the distance (d) between those potential impact points. This analysis
489 also enables evaluating potential impact points with other bounding box seg-
490 ments from detected objects, e.g., segments \overline{ab} , \overline{bc} , \overline{cd} , \overline{da} . In the ego-vehicle,

491 just the segment \overline{ab} is analyzed. Moreover, in order to determine not only
 492 moving objects, as reported in (Kusano et al., 2014), the goal is to define also
 493 when movable/static objects (e.g., vehicles parked, traffic signals, among oth-
 494 ers) can provoke AV evasive actions that may represent potential risk events
 495 immediately. Thus, this work aims to evaluate the interactions between ver-
 496 tices of both AV and movable/static objects. This is important considering
 497 that although the proximity of the AV to other objects is inherent in the vehic-
 498 ular environment (e.g., adjacent vehicles, crosswalks, crossing vehicles, among
 499 others), and therefore some risk events can result in false positives.




Figure 5: Geometric analysis of line segments, intersections and distance between the ego-vehicle and the detected objects. The segment analyzed in the detected object is \overline{bc} , and segment \overline{ab} in the ego-vehicle.

500 This analysis allows describing various interactions with surrounding objects
 501 detected by the AV. Nevertheless, it is necessary to quantify the risk when the
 502 AV is on a collision course. For that, this work uses the TTC considering the

503 detected objects' orientation as a metric to improve the analysis of traffic risk
 504 events involving the AV. The goal is to propose an improved TTC and test it
 505 with real data from AVs.

506 **4. Time-to-Collision with Motion Orientation**

507 From the analysis of camera images, it is possible to determine the position
 508 of objects. We can derive both the absolute location of the object and the
 509 position in the image through projections from 2D camera frames. As shown
 510 in Figure 6, it is possible to analyze the mapping between the world coordinate
 511 system and camera coordinate system that corresponds to the coordinate system
 512 used for vehicle navigation. Also, the object's speed related to the ego-vehicle is
 513 calculated by measuring the time difference between the sending and rebounding
 514 laser pulses from the LiDAR sensor.




Figure 6: Mapping between a real frame and the camera frame.

515 To reduce the shortcomings of SSMs proposed in the literature, we include
 516 the motion orientation and position of objects detected by the AV as a parameter

517 for the TTC calculation. The goal is to improve the accuracy of TTC to assess
 518 risk events for AV. Equation 6 summarizes the computation of TTC_{mo} :

$$TTC_{mo} = \begin{cases} \frac{d_{(obj,ego)}}{v_{ego} - v_{obj} \cos(\psi_{obj})}, & \text{if } (v_{ego} - v_{obj} \cos(\psi_{obj})) > 0, \\ \infty : \begin{cases} \text{if } (b_{ego} + sa_2) < (a, b, c, d)_{obj} < (a_{ego} - sa_1), \\ \text{or } (v_{ego} - v_{obj} \cos(\psi_{obj})) < 0, \\ \text{or } v_{ego} = 0, \end{cases} \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

519 where d is the distance between the segment/vertex on the ego-vehicle's course
 520 and the front-side of the ego-vehicle, v_{ego} is the speed of the ego-vehicle, v_{obj}
 521 is the speed of the detected object, and ψ_{obj} is the yaw angle of the detected
 522 object. The product of v_{obj} and ψ_{obj} captures the influence of the speed com-
 523 ponent on the same axis of the ego-vehicle shift (z -axis), since the geometric
 524 analysis uses the camera's reference system. On the other hand, TTC_{mo} tends
 525 to infinity when none of the bounding box vertices of detected objects are in the
 526 path of the AV or invading the safety area (sa). Likewise, it is assumed that
 527 when detected objects with speed higher than the AV. Finally, when the AV is
 528 stopped, it is inferred that there will be no risk event. The speed values of the
 529 detected objects and the ego-vehicle in the AV nuScenes are obtained directly
 530 from the dataset. On the other hand, the speed data of the ego-vehicle in the
 531 Lyft5 dataset is obtained from the analysis of translation data by means of the
 532 haversine formula (Ivis, F., 2006).

533 As a result, it is possible to differentiate traffic risk events in both car follow-

534 ing and head-on scenarios. Therefore, TTC_{mo} is conditioned to the yaw orien-
535 tation of each road user detected by the ego-vehicle. Thus, for detected objects
536 whose position indicates that they are on a collision course with the ego-vehicle,
537 as defined in Section 3.2.1, orientation angles between $-90^\circ < 0^\circ < 90^\circ$ indi-
538 cate that road users heading diverges from the ego-vehicle heading, describing
539 car-following or crossing scenarios. Thus, the speed component $v_{obj} \cos(\psi_{obj}) \geq$
540 0, and TTC_{mo} value can only be calculated when a positive speed difference
541 between the vehicles exists (Minderhoud and Bovy, 2001), which corresponds
542 to the general definition of TTC. On the other hand, orientation angles between
543 $90^\circ < 180^\circ < -90^\circ$ describe head-on or crossing scenarios, where the speed
544 component is $v_{obj} \cos(\psi_{obj}) < 0$, and indicate that the road users heading con-
545 verges with the motion direction of the ego-vehicle. Therefore, different from
546 the general definition of TTC, TTC_{mo} value is calculated by adding the speeds
547 of the ego-vehicle and the road user, following the definition in (Laureshyn et al.,
548 2010).

549 As shown in Figure 7, scenarios 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), and 7(e) show the detec-
550 tion of objects which move in the same direction as the AV, in a car following
551 event; scenarios 7(f), 7(g), 7(h), and 7(i) show the detected objects traveling in
552 opposite direction to the ego-vehicle, configuring a head-on event; finally, sce-
553 narios 7(j), 7(k), and 7(l) show AV interactions with objects converging to the
554 AV or a next point in a perpendicular trajectory, configuring a crossing event.
555 Thus, it is possible to determine if the AV may be on a collision course with
556 other road users with which the AV interacts continuously.





Scenarios	Characteristics
 <p>(a)</p>	Ego-vehicle has not detected objects.
 <p>(b) (c) (d) (e)</p>	<p>Car-following scenarios</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ego-vehicle detects objects moving in same direction, but they are not on a collision course with it (Fig. 7(b)). • Ego-vehicle detects objects ahead (Fig. 7(c)). • Ego-vehicle detects objects converging (Fig. 7(d)), or diverging (Fig. 7(e)), still remaining in the vehicle's path.
 <p>(f) (g) (h) (i)</p>	<p>Head-on scenarios</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ego-vehicle detects objects moving in opposite direction, but they are not on a collision course with it (Fig. 7(f)). • Ego-vehicle detects objects converging directly to it (Fig. 7(g)). • Ego-vehicle detects objects converging (Fig. 7(h)), or diverging (Fig. 7(i)), still remaining in the vehicle's path.
 <p>(j) (k) (l)</p>	<p>Crossing scenarios</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ego-vehicle detects objects in perpendicular direction, but they are not on a collision course with it (Fig. 7(j)). • Ego-vehicle detects objects crossing towards the lane where it is moving (Fig. 7(k)), still remaining in the vehicle's path. • Ego-vehicle detects objects crossing out the lane where it is moving (Fig. 7(l)), still remaining in the vehicle's path.

Figure 7: Possible scenarios for detected objects ahead identified by the position and motion orientation.

557 To quantify the risk level from the TTC_{mo} analysis, we employ the risk
558 coefficients proposed in (Li et al., 2017). This criterion gathers values which
559 correspond to the reaction time requirements in AVs, based on the parameters
560 described in (Rydzewski and Czarnul, 2021). Table 7 shows the risk coefficient
561 defined according to the TTC_{mo} values.

Table 7: Risk coefficient as a function of TTC.

Severity grade	TTC _{mo} [s]	Description	Risk coefficient
0	> 4.0	No safety risk	0.0
1	2.5 to 4.0	Accident-to-conflict ratio stable	0.2
2	1.5 to 2.5	Low risk level	0.3
3	1.0 to 1.5	Moderate risk level	0.6
4	≤ 1.0	High risk level	0.8

562 Motion orientation has a direct impact on the safety analysis. The road
 563 users' is random by nature, therefore it is inferred that traffic risk events require
 564 a mapping analysis of the detected objects around the ego-vehicle. Next, TTC_{mo}
 565 analysis is used on the AV datasets presented in Section 3.1.

566 5. Performance Evaluation

567 We analyze factors that can compromise vehicle and passengers safety. For
 568 this, we focused on vehicle tracking, speed limit based on traffic regulations and
 569 TTC_{mo} to estimate the risk of ego-vehicle interactions with other road users.

570 5.1. Vehicle tracking

571 The frequency of each event is influenced by the topology of the cities where
 572 the AVs circulate, as shown in Figure 8. To analyze the vehicle tracking, we
 573 enriched the datasets with data related to road type and speed limit. The ego
 574 pose data encoded in translation data are transformed into geodetic coordinates
 575 to track the vehicle. Then, we use geodetic coordinates are used to make queries
 576 in Nominatim¹ and Overpass API².

¹<https://nominatim.org/>

²<https://overpass-turbo.eu/>





Figure 8: Trajectories of the AVs in the datasets.

577 *5.2. Speed limit analysis*


578 From the vehicle tracking analysis in Section 5.1, the ego vehicle speed profile
 579 is verified to ensure compliance with traffic regulations. Figure 9 shows that
 580 the ego vehicle maintains an average speed between 15 km/h and 30 km/h in
 581 Boston, 20 km/h and 40 km/h in Singapore, and between 30 km/h and 50 km/h
 582 in Palo Alto. Likewise, the speed of vehicles moving in front of the ego vehicle
 583 is analyzed. It is possible to observe that some samples exceed the threshold
 584 speed limit established by the traffic regulations; obviously relevant information
 585 given that speeding increases the probability of risky events.

586 *5.3. TTC_{mo} evaluation*


587 Kinematic measures like speed and distance from the detected objects are
 588 used for the TTC_{mo} calculation. Speed and distance are estimated through Li-
 589 DAR measurements, while the images are used for the recognition of the various
 590 objects around the AV. Data is available in the datasets in form of annotations
 591 and metadata for each instance (object) detected by the AV. Moreover, annota-
 592 tions are identified by categories, each one associated with each object detected.



(a) Ego-vehicle speed vs. road speed limit in Singapore.



(b) Ego-vehicle speed vs. road speed limit in Boston.



(c) Ego-vehicle speed vs. road speed limit in Palo Alto.

Figure 9: Relationship between the ego-vehicle speed and the road speed limit. Green marks describe the maximum speed allowed for each road type. Some road types have different speed limits; these are identified with thick and thin marks

593 Table 8 shows the observation statistics for the objects detected by the frontal

594 camera.

Table 8: Categories instances in the AV datasets.

Dataset	nuScenes		Lyft5
	Singapore	Boston	Palo Alto
Images analyzed	14,106	18,617	21,640
Instance annotations	11,308	21,251	10,525
Sample annotations	107,615	225,957	227,043
Vehicles	46,262	137,927	211,287
Two-wheelers	4,373	2,835	7,039
Pedestrians	25,915	36,221	8,672
Animals	36	121	45
Traffic objects	31,029	49,853	–

595 To analyze potential risk events, AV datasets are examined to assess the
596 driving behavior. For that, annotations made to images captured by the front
597 camera are analyzed. Annotations with no speed data are discarded: 5% from
598 the Lyft5 dataset, 4.3% from the Boston subset, and 1.1% from the Singapore
599 subset. Next, we evaluate the regular TTC defined in Equation 1 for all the valid
600 annotations, in order to observe the proportion of objects interacting with the
601 ego-vehicle. In proportion, approximately 70% of the samples represent some
602 risk level w.r.t. valid ones, as shown in Figure 10. Different from the analysis
603 with the regular TTC, which only discards events when $v_{obj} > v_{ego}$, the TTC_{mo}
604 methodology proposed in Section 3 allows to determine which objects may be
605 in the ego-vehicle’s course. Therefore, objects that are not in the course of
606 the ego-vehicle, or those whose exceeds the position angle threshold defined
607 in Section 3.2.1 are discarded, since they do not represent a potential traffic
608 conflict. Therefore, Annotations of objects converging to the ego-vehicle’s course
609 or the safety zone defined in Section 3.2.2 are analyzed. The proportion of
610 samples representing some risk w.r.t. valid ones corresponds approximately 4%
611 to 5% for Palo Alto and Singapore subsets, and approx. 8% for the Boston

612 subset, as observed in Figure 10.




Figure 10: Number of annotations ($\times 10^3$) assessed for the analysis of potential risk events in the AV datasets studied. Hatch pattern bars in Analyzed label on x-axis correspond to the TTC general formulation analysis; solid color bars correspond to the TTC_{mo} proposed in this work.

613 Figure 11 shows the TTC_{mo} and conventional TTC frequency distributions
614 for each analyzed dataset. It is possible to observe that the distribution in all
615 cities is very similar, with distributions skewed to the right. Therefore, the 5th
616 and the 85th percentiles are evaluated, which represent the most pronounced
617 inflection points in the cumulative distribution. Values below the 5th percentile
618 represent TTC values < 2.4 s in all datasets. We also note that the bulk of
619 representative TTC samples are concentrated in up to 33 s, with an average of
620 maximum 18 s. On the other hand, comparing the distribution of TTC and
621 TTC_{mo} , it is possible to observe that the TTC_{mo} distribution in Singapore and
622 Boston subsets is smaller than TTC distribution, which allows us to observe a
623 trend towards a decrease in the frequency of high-risk events. Therefore, TTC_{mo}
624 appears to have a more precise collision course compared to TTC, which leads
625 to a stricter definition of conflicts and less data to be analyzed. Meanwhile, the
626 distribution of TTC_{mo} in Palo Alto is contrary to the data trend in Singapore


627 or Boston. It is possible to observe an increment in the frequency of events with
 628 time < 10 s, however, the frequency in time > 10 s decreases compared with
 629 TTC distribution. This trend can be influenced by interactions with parked
 630 vehicles along the AV route.

631 From the annotations analyzed in Figure 10, it is possible to observe the
 632 frequency and the type of events concerning potential risk events, when both
 633 the objects and the ego-vehicle are in collision course. Table 9 shows the total
 634 frequency of event types based on the course of detected objects, as described
 635 in Section 3.2.1, classified as following, head-on, and crossing events. Course
 636 analysis can help to analyze the way in which these objects converge with the
 637 AVs. These data are important to consider the severity of the event. For
 638 example, a car-following event can have a different effect than a head-on event.


Table 9: Conflict types defined by position and orientation concerning to the ego-vehicle.

Event/City	Singapore	Boston	Palo Alto
Following	3,094	4,452	7,022
Head-on	595	824	147
Lane-change	267	349	104
Crossing	4,947	6,456	1,463
Total events	8,903	12,081	8,736


639 To analyze the risk level of the ego-vehicle interactions with other objects,
 640 we use the severity hierarchy based on the level and severity zones proposed
 641 by Hydén (Hydén, 1987). Severity level defines a threshold for serious and
 642 non-serious conflicts. On the other hand, severity zones quantitatively define
 643 severity levels. Both severity level and zones are based on a relationship between
 644 time and speed. A fixed threshold to define a high-risk event is based on the



(a) Singapore.



(b) Boston.



(c) Palo Alto.

Figure 11: Cumulative and Probability Density Functions for TTC_{mo} and $TTC < 100$ s for each dataset.

645 Time-to-Accident (TA) under a traffic conflict. This value was established at
 646 1.5 s (Hydén, 1987), which is consistent with the studies reported in (Rydzewski
 647 and Czarnul, 2021), and that corresponds to the response time of the sensors

648 readings, processing, recognition and planning tasks of the AV between the
649 detection of an obstacle and the evasive action.

650 All interactions that represent some risk level for the ego-vehicle are pre-
651 sented in Figure 12. All interactions within the 5th percentile are plotted, as
652 observed in the cumulative distributions of Figure 11. We note that most of the
653 observed interactions in SG and Boston occur with vehicles and objects. Fig-
654 ure 12(a) shows that interactions with $TTC_{mo} < 1.5$ s occur with other moving
655 vehicles, with a deceleration pattern as the TTC_{mo} decreases. On the other
656 hand, in PA we observe more interactions with parked vehicles. This charac-
657 teristic is due to Lyft5 vehicles move along the roadside parking areas, next to
658 the first lane at right, where some parked vehicles are invading the safety area
659 (*sa*) defined for the AV. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that inter-
660 actions with pedestrians show some events that represent lower risk of collision,
661 as shown in Figure 12(b). The same behavior is observed for the two-wheelers
662 in Figure 12(c). Finally, Figure 12(d) shows the interactions with objects of the
663 vehicular infrastructure like barriers, traffic cones, among others.

664 To summarize, the proportion of interactions for all the annotations ana-
665 lyzed represents less than 1% for high-risk events, whereas events with some
666 risk represent approximately 10%. Events that do not represent any risk repre-
667 sent more than 70%, as shown in Figure 13. Compared to valid annotations, the
668 proportion of interactions that represent some risk level is less than 2%. This
669 is consistent with the results observed in (Beauchamp et al., 2022) and (De Ce-
670 unynck et al., 2022), where it is observed that most traffic events are not risky




Figure 12: TTC_{mo} 5th percentile indicators for each scenario in relation to ego-vehicle speed and acceleration. Acceleration changes are shown in heatmap color variations. The columns describe the city where the interactions take place: to the left Singapore (SG), to the center Boston, and to the right Palo Alto (PA). Meanwhile, the rows describe the general category of objects interacting with the AV. Conflicts above the black line on the graphs are ranked as serious; below the black line, non-serious.

671 for the ego-vehicle. Furthermore, compared to (Li et al., 2017), it is observed
 672 that moderate and high risk events have a lower proportion. Nonetheless, the
 673 experimentation environment is different, and the results are expressive due to
 674 our analysis takes advantage of the sensors mobility and the variability of the
 675 scenarios where the vehicles transit.




Figure 13: Annotation volume based on severity grade ratio.

676 The present TTC_{mo} analysis allows to assess risk events through the geo-
 677 metric analysis of the boundaries associated with each object detected by the
 678 AVs. Thus, it is possible to limit the analysis to objects in a possible collision
 679 course. This is relevant for TTC_{mo} analysis since it is possible to identify how
 680 interactions occur with various road users and objects. Nevertheless, further
 681 investigation is needed to establish a pattern of AV behavior with a longer time
 682 sequence in the scenes, mainly to obtain more parameters to describe driving
 683 behavior patterns related the AI system that controls the vehicle.

684 An advantage of data analysis through exteroceptive sensors is that risk as-
 685 sessment is not limited to claims related to vehicles only. This is observed in
 686 Figure 12, where the TTC_{mo} is assessed for various categories and attributes

687 available in the datasets. Moreover, the distribution of risk events was similar
688 among the three datasets, with 85% of the sampling concentrated in less than
689 33 s, and the highest risk events below 2.4 s, as shown in Figure 11. It is also
690 important to note that the analysis of safety metrics for various road users will
691 depend on the data labeling available. This can be observed for example in
692 Table 8, where the Lyft5 dataset does not have data related to traffic infras-
693 tructure objects. It is important to explainability requirements to understand
694 traffic conflicts between detected objects and the ego-vehicle, based on the road
695 users motion.

696 It should be noted that there are some limitations in the used AV datasets.
697 The sampling time of each scene is limited to a maximum of 25 s (Lyft5), and
698 20 s (nuScenes), in most cases without sequence, which prevents observing a
699 greater number of events with potential risk. Another limitation is related with
700 the speed of the AVs analyzed, which is much lower than the limit speeds of the
701 road infrastructure. The speed uniformity of the AVs reduces the possibility
702 of observing the effect of the evasive actions by the AV. Finally, the number of
703 vehicles limits the risk assessment analysis since the age and learning experience
704 of the autonomous system may still be limited.

705 On the other hand, sensor-associated errors can influence the risk analysis of
706 the ego-vehicle. Despite the existence of errors in both translation and speed in
707 both datasets, object detection based on LiDAR and the camera perform well
708 in image-only methods to infer the dimensions of the detected objects and their
709 kinematic measurements (Caesar et al., 2020). In fact, object detection is a

710 challenging area since objects around are not symmetric, contain different foot-
711 prints, and therefore, the computation of bounding boxes generation is a hard
712 problem. It is important noting that TTC_{mo} is a metric that depends on the
713 object detection and kinematic variables related to the object, and therefore,
714 requires high precision of the sensors. Otherwise, TTC_{mo} calculation may re-
715 sult in erroneous measurements influenced by errors of the autonomous system
716 driving the vehicle.

717 Finally, the calculation of TTC_{mo} considering the motion orientation of the
718 detected objects reduces the overload generated by the volume of data in the
719 safety analysis. Thus, our improved TTC_{mo} reduces by up to 60% the proportion
720 of data to be analyzed when compared to the regular TTC. Motion orientation
721 and geometry analysis enable to discard all objects that, despite interacting
722 with the AV, they do not converge on a collision course, and therefore, they do
723 not represent a risk for AV. It is relevant if we consider that safety monitoring
724 requires immediate analysis when exists potential traffic conflicts.

725 **6. Conclusion and Future Work**

726 This study aims to explore the potential of using AV data to identify high-
727 risk events in traffic by analyzing TTC and motion orientation. Real data col-
728 lected from AVs in different cities was used to identify risk events. A detailed
729 data analysis and processing are presented in this study, in addition to serving
730 as a guide for other researchers who want to use public AV datasets. In par-
731 ticular, we study traditional SSM like TTC considering the motion orientation

732 of the road users detected by the AV. This is a scenario few explored since the
733 information of the road users is limited when there are no direct measurements
734 of them. By the motion orientation, it is possible to analyze diverse scenarios
735 like following, head-on and crossing events. This allows a more intuitive safety
736 analysis related to all detected objects moving in different directions.

737 As future work, our goal is to describe traffic risk events accurately to im-
738 prove the risk assessment process in AVs. For this, it is necessary to manage the
739 data to optimize the analysis of the data collection available in each ego vehicle,
740 so that it is scalable, and responds to the immediateness of risk assessments.

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